Essay Plan: Stalin's War Leadership

This question is on the specification paper, and so there is a good chance that an alternate (eg the economy's significance) will come up on the actual paper, 2010.

"Stalin's leadership was the most significant reason for the Soviet victory over Germany in the 1941-1945 war" - assess the validity of this statement

Pearson states that "as a highly centralised dictatorship, Joseph Stalin almost certainly played a pivotal part in every aspect of the Soviet war effort", suggesting that Stalin's leadership was crucial to the war effort, and that the USSR would not have been as strong were it not for him. Although this is certainly true, many other factors did contribute to the war victory, including the merits of the Soviet economy under Gosplan, and the GKO (general defence council) which was established in Stalin's absence early in the war, as well as the infamous Soviet winter of 1941. Despite this, however, many historians agree that the USSR would not have been so likely to win the Great Patriotic War were it not for Stalin's efforts.

STALIN'S LEADERSHIP - POSITIVES
- Establishment of Stavka - PEARSON: "At a critical moment he proved himself to be resolute and decisive"
- Order No 270, Aug 1941, "all deserters will be shot and their families imprisoned"
- allowing military leaders to flourish
- turning the war into one of attrition, to his advantage, eg at Stalingrad - DOCKRILL: "Stalingrad marked the beginning of the end for Germany"
- Propaganda

STALIN'S LEADERSHIP - NEGATIVE
- PEARSON: "Stalin's first, most fatal error was not to allow his troops to mobilise in time before impending Nazi disaster"
- absence at start of war - debated as to whether this really happened
- military purge, 1937
- responsible for many fatal flaws such as Seige of Leningrad

OTHER FACTORS
- HARRISON: "If WW2 was a test then the Soviet Economy passed it" - & Overy's correlation argument (years when economy failed (1942-3) war effort failed; as economy improved, war effort did, too)
- Winter argument, 1941

CONCLUSION
- was critical to the war effort, and arguably the most important reason

Ta-da! My fifth essay plan of the say (I did two on paper before I ran out of paper... oops?)

I need a life/a break...

- HistGrrl x
- GKO est in his absence

Essay Plan: Nationalism

This question isn't specifically about a longer period of time, such as the thematic questions tend to be, but it's important, I think, to address both long and short term issues when answering it.


To what extent was the failure of the Soviet leadership to address the potential threat from nationalism early enough responsible for the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991?

Although most historians agree that a considerable number of factors contributed to the break-up of the USSR in 1991, most state that the explosion of tensions within the nationalities were the major trigger for this. National tension had existed within the USSR since its very creation, with Ward stating that Lenin's greatest error was to allow republics to maintain their own names and governments rather than uniting them under one, central government, as this allowed for national movements to continue beneath the surface from 1917, so that when economic and political pressures became too much, as they did under Gorbachev, the nationalist threats all rose at once, creating serious problems for the government in Moscow. As Laver states, "the nationalities problem was a time-bomb waiting to explode".

NATIONALITIES
- 1940 secession of Baltic States to USSR means that national tension especially strong
- Comparative openness under Khrushchev lead many to expect better & this tension continued to grow (eg Hungary, which was first Eastern Bloc nation to open its borders, 1988)
- major problems begin under Brezhnev - LAVER: "Letting sleeping dogs lie"
- LAVER: "If there was a nationalities problem then Brezhnev did not solve it"
- Helsinki groups
- Glasnost created greater problems with raised expectations
- BRESLAUR: "Gorbachev's greatest error was not to reconcile the results of glasnost with the rise of nationalism in the USSR"
- Ukraine's secession out of USSR seen as the moment at which the USSR finally knew it would collapse
- benefit of hindsight - WARD's comment that no one saw it coming


OTHER FACTORS
- MARPLES: "Gorbachev failed to recognise that Yeltsin and the radicals were the future"
- failures of perestroika = collapsing economy
- failure to make any decent decision about the economy
- allowing the Eastern Bloc to secede
- concentration on foreign policy
- August coup
- rise of other political parties
- political uncertainty and reshuffle of party organs etc

CONCLUSION
- had nationalism been combatted sooner, the USSR may not have collapsed when it did
- however other fundamental problems made the collapse inevitable, as Laver suggests

Last time I tried this essay, I singularly failed to understand it. I think this plan is kinda good, though, so YAY! :)

Love,

- HistGrrl x

Essay Plan: Opposition to Brezhnev

To what extent did the Brezhnev regime succeed in silencing opposition to its policies?

Opposition to the policies of the Brezhnev regime came from both inside and outside of the USSR, and, although Laver states that there was "no evidence of widespread dissatisfaction" amongst the Soviet people at this time, the growth of opposition in the form of dissidence, national revolts, and international tension was recognised as highly significant, and was, for the most part, successfully silent. However, the international dimension served to undo all the work done to silence such views from within the USSR, as the BBC Russian service kept citizens aware of opposition in all its forms, leading some to speculate that it was this opposition which eventually lead to the eventual national riots and emergence of other 'political parties' under Gorbachev.

OPPOSITION FROM WITHIN
- Sinyavskey and Daniel - lead to 1967 KGB unit "against ideological diversions"; imprisonment of all dissidents; tighter control over culture and social policy
- 1965 Red Square Protest - lead to the above
- Helsinki Groups - protesting peacefully for human rights; little effect
- Jewish Emigration; silenced by allowing it to happen
- Czechslovakia 1968 - successfully silenced, sent a warning to other nationalities
- worries of Islamic Fundamentalism - silenced through war in Afghanistan
- most people continued to conform; apathy the dominant political force

OPPOSITION OUTSIDE
- writer contacted foreign journalists
- BBC Russian Service
- Boycott of Moscow Olympics sends a signal to the Russian people

CONCLUSION
- successful within the USSR, but lack of success in the rest of the world counter-balanced this by allowing people to continue to see resistance

Essay Plan: Effects of War

Asses the economic and social costs to the Soviet people of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 to 1945, in the years to Stalin's death in 1953.

Revisionist historians agree that, despite the devastation left in the wake of the Great Patriotic War, it did have a great strengthening effect on the Soviet people, having unified them against a common enemy and brought them together for so long. Although the lives and resources lost to the war effort were significant and almost certainly detrimental to the recovery of the USSR to Stalin's death in 1953, the economic "miracle", as Nove terms is, serves almost completely to nullify this. Social conditions, however, did not undergo the same miraculous recover, with the Cold War and paranoia on Stalin's part causing the grip over the population to tighten and social restrictions to become more all-encompassing than before. Thus, the social costs of the war may outweigh economic recovery, because of their more direct effects on the lives of the Soviet People.

ECONOMY

COSTS
- agriculture - scorches Earth
- industry lost resources in move East
- loss of workers
- focus on arms
- tighter control than ever before

RECOVERY
- "remarkable"
- 1950 statistics up on 1940
- resources and trading partners gained from Eastern Bloc
- quantitative
- industry = :)
- NOVE: "agriculture, in Stalin's final years, was characterised by excessive centralisation of decisions, insufficient investment, extremely low prices and ill-judged intentions"

SOCIAL COSTS

DESPITE UNITY IN WAR EFFORT:
- 20 000 000 people dead
- Zhadnovshchina
- anti-cosmopolitanism
- Soviet nationalism
- loss of individual identity
- orthodox church rejected again
- living conditions still pretty dire
- Cold War isolationism
- LYNCH: "Paranoia had a large part to play in the Soviet politics of the time"

RECOVERY?
- not really...

CONCLUSION

- economic costs were not too terrible and were easily recovered
- social costs were dire and never were solved until Khrushchev's arrival, when they were addressed
- social costs outweigh economic recovery in their effects on the Soviet people

Essay Plan: Social Conditions

I HATE SOCIAL CONDITIONS. Thought you should know.

Did the condition of the Soviet people improve or deteriorate during the era of Brezhnev and Gorbachev?

When Brezhnev took power in the USSR in 1964, the Soviet people had better rights and personal freedoms than ever before because of the comparative liberalism of Khrushchev's regime. However, living conditions in this period, and the treatment of suspect nationalities, for example, were not good, having not improved significantly since Stalin's day. Thus, the changes under Brezhnev and Gorbachev can be seen to have created definite improvements, leading to higher expectations from the Soviet people in the areas left unsolved, leading to one of the major causes of the fall of the USSR in 1991.

BREZHNEV

POSITIVE
- divorce, contraception, abortion
- 50% more fruit, veg, meat and fish eaten
- equal pay in almost all professions
- Jewish emigration

NEGATIVE
- tighter cultural control
- 1967 KGB wing against "ideological diversion"
- alcoholism
- poverty
- position of women

BUT the regime tried to tackle the latter three problems with large-scale propaganda campaigns (see www.sovietposter.blogspot.com).

ANDROPOV AND CHERNENKO

POSITIVE
- Andropov's education and anti-alcoholism policies

NEGATIVE
- no time to make real change

GORBACHEV

POSITIVE
- Glasnost raised expectation
- improvements in medical care
- campaign against alcoholism

NEGATIVE
- raised expectations
- LAVER: "Glasnost proved a double-edged sword for Gorbachev"
- no improvements in role of women

CONCLUSION
- improved in many areas but lead to unrealistic expectations from population

Hope this helps :) Questions?

- HistGrrl x

Essay: Destalinisation

Hello! Sorry for the gap between posts recently - I've been working from the library where there are very few opportunities to blog... but, I do get a lot done, so that's good!

Anyway, this is an essay I wrote a while back, in timed conditions, which my teacher has graded at a Level 5, which is the top band of a grade A. I thought it might help you to see what this looks like, as well as helping remind me!

To what extent was destalinisation responsible for Khrushchev's fall from power?

The process of destalinisation, defined by Thatcher as "the elimination of Stakuinist excesses and policies as well as the cult of personality from Soviet politics, post-1953" was the root of many of Khrushchev's policies, and most notably those which faced most criticism or which failed most quickly.Therefore, it seems reasonable to take the view of many historians that it was the biggest contributor to his downfall, despite many other evident factors.

Destalinisation influenced almost all Khrushchev era policies, including the economic reforms he attempted. Despite fierce opposition, which ultimately lead to failure, decentralisation was attempted in order to rid the system of bureaucracy. However, as some have suggested that by the end of Khrushchev's regime, there was up to a third more bureaucracy then there had been previously, demonstrating the flaws in this policy, as well as causing the 1963 growth rate to plummet to less than that of 1933. This, having come only a year before Khrushchev was ousted and at the height of the East/West competition, must therefore be seen as a highly significant reason for the plot against Khrushchev. Bemo also suggests that the extent of bureaucratic reform failures may have lead to further opposition, only helping to build the case for Khrushchev's ousting.

The restructuring of the Stalinist system which came with destalinisation wrought most change in the political system, where Khrushchev split the party into agricultural and industrial wings in an attempt to bypass the Stalinist Gosplan system and bring about more coherence. Again, this caused significant opposition from the bureaucracy, as well as leading to confusion and what Filtzer describes as "bureaucratic anarchy", making it perfectly clear to all those in positions of power that Khrushchev's reforms were not working. The distaste this surely caused will only have been exacerbated by his moves to give the party, as opposed to the government, more control than it had had under Stalin, by stating that members could only hold positions of power for a set period, and by reducing benefits and privileges which came with powerful positions, a move later attempted by Gorbachev. Although Filtzer praises Khrushchev for "putting the party back at the centre of the political stage", the vested interests within the party were disrupted, causing many of these high up in the system to turn against him. The fact that this was the first set of reforms to be overturned by Brezhnev and Kosygin must also surely prove it as having been a significant factor in his ousting.

Another element which Thatcher describes as having been pivotal to Stalinism, "aggressive foreign policy", was amended under Khrushchev and through destalinisation, in what the West have termed as "the thaw". With hindsight, it is easy to see how Khrushchev's international exploits may always have had the USSR's best interests in mind, this was not the view shared by the party at the time. He may have become what Laver has called "truly an international statesman", but his presence at home in solving native issues was more of a concern within the Soviet Union, and many historians cite that this is a major reason that he was forced from power.

There were, of course, other reasons for Khrushchev being forced from power, one of the most notable being his failed agarian reforms. Stalin had been criticised early on for his failure to accept advice, and the secret speech had condemned collectivisation, however the Virgin Lands Scheme under Khrushchev was arguably the greatest agricultural failure since the revolution. Khrushchev, being from a rural background, claimed to have a good knowledge of agriculture and therefore embarked on what most historians recognise as a vast propaganda campaign, into which insufficient planning and too much funding was placed. Although the first year saw a significant boost in agricultural output, this began to plummet in subsequent years, proving to party members that Khrushchev's agricultural knowledge was little more than arrogance. Laver, therefore, suggests that this was a highly significant reson for Khrushchev's fall from power.

Another vast blow which most accept as having vastly catalysed Khrushchev's fall from power was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which came just two years before Khrushchev eventually fell from power. Although with hindsight it is possible to see that the agreement made with US President Kennedy was beneficial to both the USA and the USSR, the only clauses officially disclosed suggested a victory in diplomacy for America. Coming as this did at arguably the most tense period of the Cold War, it appeared to many within the USSR that Khrushchev simply was not a strong enough leader and that 'backing down' to the USA was the ultimate proof of weakness. Historians agree almost unanimously that this was a highly significant event in the lead up to Khrushchev's fall from power.

However, perhaps the most significant proof that destalinisation was ultimately responsible for Khrushchev's fall from power comes in the manner in which he was ousted: peacefully, by the demands of his colleagues, who would surely not have dared to do the same under Stalin. Although destalinisation did not aim to end the strict control of the population (as demonstrated in Hungary in 1956), it did bring about the end of totalitarianism in the USSR, through a series of legal and cultural reforms, the relative successes of which are, in the West, generally deemed positive. Therefore, as Khrushchev himself has stated, he brought about the end of the total fear within the party, and, despite other contributing factors, this can be seen to prove that destalinisation was ultimately responsible for his fall from power in 1964.

So, hope that helps! :) More essay plans are a-comin'! :)

- HistGrrl xx

Essay Plan: Perestroika

This is a horrible essay because of the wording of the question. I've planned it on paper, but it's atrocious, so I'm trying again here to see what happens. Inability to articulate ideas today may have something to do with the fact that I sat an exam this morning and am feeling a little bit more than a little bit fried...

"Perestroika was a disaster because it brought down a system that people had learned to live with without putting anything substantial in its place" - To what extent to you agree?

Historians agree almost unanimously that Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika, introduced in 1987 to 'restructure' (and thus reinvigorate) the Soviet economy, was a disaster by 1991: as Laver states, "Perestroika appeared to be making things worse". It can thus be seen to have brought down the Soviet Union because of the discontent it caused amongst a population who knew no other system and who saw "nothing substantial in its place". However, it can also be seen as a disaster because of the rifts it caused within the communist party, and because of the vast economic failures it caused, which are also commonly seen as having caused the break-up of the USSR.

Yes - that's why it was a disaster
- LAVER: "Over the previous decade or more, many people had increasingly benefitted from the existing system" - living conditions, full employment etc
- POPOLOV: "It was done with slogans, not a programme of reform that ordinary Russians could understand"
- Attempts to create a market economy in state confines would never work and were always going to cause problems
- People began to see the weaknesses in the system
- Caused general strikes in the nationalities because nothing solid was there
- Rise of other parties (for same reaons)
- Yeltsin (see above)

No - it was a disaster for other reasons
- Made no attempt to tackle legacy of corruption
- Confusing administrative changes
- Devaluation of rouble; 15% decrease in production
- Agriculture ignored
- Rifts within the party inherently weakened the system and allowed Yeltsin and the radicals in

It cannot be doubted that "perestroika was a disaster", and, although there are many reasons for this, the fact that it weakened the system and lead to general discontent because no new system replaced it is perhaps the most significant of these reasons. As Gorbachev said in his final speech as leader of the USSR, before it seceded to the Russian Federation, "the old system collapsed before the new one could begin to function".

If anyone could tell me if that makes sense, I would be eternally grateful!

- HistGrrl x

Essay Plan: Economic Overview

This is an example of an overview question (45 marks) for which I have created an essay plan.

I always plan in exams, but not in this much detail; it's a good revision technique! In exams, I use bullet points first, briefly - say, one per paragraph - and then write the introduction, as this is where I lay out my argument, so I can make sure that I don't divert from the plan and that I know what it is that I'm arguing.

As this is an overview question, I've planned it per leader.

How far was the failure to achieve effective economic reform between 1941 and 1991 responsible for the break-up of the USSR?

Most historians agree that economic problems throughout the history of the USSR have been a significant cause of discontent both within the party and without, leading to stagnation during the Brezhnev era and beyond and ultimately having a large part to play in the discontent of the early 1990s. The failure of all leaders to significantly reform the system can thus be seen not only to have caused rifts in the party but to have resulted in the break up of the USSR by 1991.

Plan

STALIN
- caused the rigidity of the economy which meant no one after could reform
- historians agree that it was strong and that it was what was necessary during the war and in its immediate aftermath, but that is became too rigid
- HARRISON: "If WW2 was a test then the Soviet Economy passed it"
- Legacy of superpower status: OVERY: "The Soviet state was transformed by this process, and communism, close to collapse in the Autumn of 1941, came to be the dominant political force across Eurasia from East Germany to North Korea"

KHRUSHCHEV
- attempts at reform fail, but boost economy - maintaining it for the mean time
- tries to remove bureaucracy; causes it to grow by 1/3 making it harder to change later on and proving the fact that it was impossible to reform
- FILTZER: "Khrushchev never attempted to remove the basic levers of Stalinism within the USSR; those of central planning"

BREZHNEV
- NOVE: "Economically speaking, the Brezhnev period has to be seen as a disaster"
- no attempts at reform made, save for in agriculture, where they weakened the system further by causing unnecessary change and directing investment away from industry with no tangible successes resulting
- one reason for the rise of dissidence?
- black market undermining the system just left to grow

ANDROPOV
- dies before black market reforms have a chance to work

GORBACHEV
- lights nationalist fire; general strikes etc
- causes party rifts

OTHER REASONS FOR USSR'S COLLAPSE
- political corruption
- Gorbachev's personal failings

Conclusion
- Yes, in the long-term, it was a significant reason for the collapse of the USSR

Hoping this help!

- HistGrrl x

Themes: Nationalist Tension

Nationalist tension has always existed within the USSR, and has always been a cause of instability and a worry to leaders. As with some other topics, we'll investigate the war and the "High Stalinism" period separately.

The War Years
- Jews, Tartars and other minority nationalities treated with hostility and suspicion
- worries that they'd ally with the Nazis
- many deported to Siberia or rounded up and sent to labour camps
- the fight for "Mother Russia" alienated many
- Nazi treatment of Jews and Slavs commonly seen as having been a major cause of Nazi loss (believed them subhuman so wouldn't allow them to fight for the Reich)
- Tartar exile 1944; Keys suggests was one of the only rational racial exiles, as many had actually allied with the Nazis - entire Tartar race (200 000 people exiled to Central Asia, with 40 000 dying on the way)
- most were fully involved in Soviet war effort
- 'Guilty by association'
- LAVER: "Stalin was obsessed with a supposed national threat"

High Stalinism
- wartime paranoia continues
- national tensions kept at bay by totalitarian nature of regime

Khrushchev
- LAVER: "through nationalist reform, the USSR was also discouraged"
- Poland and Hungary, 1956
- Warsaw Pact
- break from Stalinist cultural control
- Stalinist treatment of religious groups (eg Jews wanting to emigrate to Israel)

Brezhnev
- Stagnation & poor economic growth lead to rises in national tension, especially from the better of nationalities who did not wish to be associated with Russia
- Helsinki accords lead to hope of reform
- Dissidence more potent amongst national minorities
- Prague Spring
- LAVER: "If there was a national threat then Brezhnev did not solve it"
- Deliberate 'russification' or republics/letting sleeping dogs lie
- Brezhnev Doctrine
- Olympics lead to campaign of Soviet nationalism

Gorbachev and the collapse of the USSR
- 'Glasnost' lead to hopes of national freedom
- Economic failure and 'left over' dissatisfaction lead to increased growth in nationalism
- fuelled by political moves to democracy
- LAVER: "a timebomb waiting to explode"
- break up began in nationalities
- August Coup lead many nationalities to claim independence
- CIS
- break up of Warsaw pact
- Lithuania
- trigger cause of collapse of USSR?

How significant a threat were nationalities all along?

Many historians have speculated that the national threat which came to dominate Soviet politics towards the end of the USSR had been long-existent and that it had simply reacted particularly harshly to more political freedoms and to drastic economic conditions. The threat was clearly present in some nationalities, such as Ukraine, since well before the Second World War, when Ukrainian peasants fought especially potently against the collectivisation drive; and the fact that most historians agree that the moment Ukraine seceded was essentially the moment that the USSR fell suggests that this long-existent tension was incredibly important in the collapse of the USSR.

The tensions in the Baltic states which were taken during WW2 were certainly the strongest, as they had the longest tradition of independence and were most able to remember the pre-Soviet era: thus the fact that Gorbachev's one attempt to halt secession happened as he sent tanks into Lithuania suggests that even the regime saw these as the greatest threat.

The threat of religious races has also been seen as highly significant, with the only major threat from within the USSR, under Khrushchev, being from the highly repressed Jews wishing to emigrate to their newly formed republic of Israel. Religious tensions also exacerbated problems within the Asian republics under Brezhnev, as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan faced particularly harsh repression as well as strong economic incentives to conform, with much investment being given to these.

Hope this helps! That's pretty much half your essay written for you because I got a little carried away!

Much love xo

- HistGrrl x

Themes: Foreign Policy

When talking about Foreign Policy, you must ALWAYS talk about its significance within the USSR. Talking about it as a stand-alone element is neither relevant to the course, nor analytical. So, how did it affect leaderships and perceptions of leaders? Did it bring opposition or prove weakness?

As this theme is harder to analyse, I'm providing examples of short paragraphs of analysis after the information.

This theme is going to include the war as a separate element to High Stalinism - and I should probably warn you that I'm doing this one off the top of my head...

The Great Patriotic War
- working with the Allies
- suspicion of foreign powers
- against Germany, Norway and Finland
- A-Bomb
- "Soviet Sphere of Influence"
- Potsdam and Yalta conferences - the cause of the Cold War?
- Lend-Lease

The tensions created by the beginning of the cold war lead Stalin's regime to become even more internal and to spend a lot more on military and defence, dramatically effecting the economy. The Atomic Bomb also lead to changes in policy towards scientists and mathematicians, who were given more civil liberties in order to incentivise them.

High Stalinism
- THATCHER: "aggressive foreign policy"
- Aggression over East Berlin
- Defence spending rocketed
- Comecon
- Not involved in diplomacy with the rest of the world
- Seen as trying to "take over the world"

The internal nature of Stalin's regime at this time lead to distaste and bad feeling from the West, making later easing in relations even harder. However, the "percieved menace of the West" left Stalin with a suitable excuse to become more brutal in his internal policy, and lead him to be presented as a stronger leader, something that many historians agree Russians find necessary in their leaders - especially at this time, when memories of the Tsar were still existent.

Khrushchev
- the "thaw"
- U-2 incident
- Berlin Wall
- Start of the Vietnam War in earnest
- Warsaw Pact
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- economic aid to the third world
- alliance with China breaking down
- Sputnik and the space race
- Suez Crisis, 1956

Khrushchev's role in Soviet Foreign Policy is often seen as having been fatal because of the contradictions between the supposed "thaw" of destalinisation and the problems he caused with the West, over instances such as the building of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact and Cuban Missile Crisis. The "thaw" made him unpopular in the USSR, and his handling of these major events presented him as weak and aggressive both at home and abroad.

The effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis were especially fatal, given that clauses of the Kennedy/Khrushchev agreement which lead to the removal of US nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe were kept secret on the international stage, making it seem as though he had backed down, and thus presenting him as weak within the USSR. This is commonly seen as having been a major cause of his downfall.

Brezhnev
- SALT
- Détente
- Helsinki
- Moscow Olympics
- Afghanistan
- Brezhnev Doctrine

Laver has argued that "Brezhnev presided over a crucial period of Soviet Foreign Policy", given that his actions provoked distaste and opposition both within the USSR and abroad; although the initial SALT treaties and détente meetings were successful in the West as well as in the USSR, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 is often seen as having been the breaking point. Causing millions of Soviet deaths, and often being referred to as "Russia's Vietnam", the war was as unpopular at home as it was in the West, where a boycott of the Moscow Olympics was called in protest, demonstrating the regime's unpopularity abroad to dissidents at home, thus exacerbating the problem.

Gorbachev
- popular in the West; seen as an international statesman
- membership of the UN
- ending the cold war?
- talks with Regan and Bush successful

Despite Gorbachev's vast successes in nuclear disarmament and in making the USSR acceptable on the world stage, he is often perceived within the USSR as having cared too much for Western ways of life and for PR as opposed to serious policies. Some argue that, had he spent less time on Foreign Policy, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 could have been averted.

As ever - any questions, just ask! :)

- HistGrrl x

Unit Two - Destalinisation (part three)

Back again! Make sure you're ready for this - because pretty soon, it gets even more boring. Yes, pretty soon, we're tackling B-R-E-Z-H-N-E-V... *shudders*

Anyway. On with the show. :)

Ousting Khrushchev

ANTI-PARTY CONSPIRACY
- May 1957, majority of Presidium members threatened to demote Khrushchev
- Zhukov stood against them and said the military would intervene without a vote
- plotters gave in and Khrushchev had them removed from the Presidium

CHANGES POST-CONSPIRACY
- Khrushchev's supporters in key positions
- became Commander-in-Chief
- held all Stalin's old positions
- established a system where a % of the powerful positions had to be re-elected each Congress

OUSTING KHRUSHCHEV
- reforms failed; concerns
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- called to a Presidium meeting in october 1964 and presented with a list of his own short-comings
- no supporters came forward; he resigned

What were the main effects of the Anti-party conspiracy and Khrushchev's downfall?

Criticisms of Khrushchev

...OF PERSONALITY AND STYLE
- disliked
- brash
- opportunist
- seen as building a cult-of-personality
- too focussed on foreign relations

...OF INTERNAL POLICY
- party reforms too radical
- economic growth declined
- agriculture still failing
- bad consumer goods
- nuclear expenditure annoyed army

...OF FOREIGN POLICY
- 1956 Suez Crisis
- provocative Berlin policy
- 3rd world aid brought no benefits
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- destalinisation caused problems in the Eastern Bloc and China
- general conduct upset colleagues

What was the main reason for Khrushchev's fall from power?

So, that's Khrushchev been and gone! On to Brezhnev...

(You might want to find yourself a stiff whisky before the next blog. I warn you in advance... *shudders*)

- HistGrrl x