Hello! Sorry for the gap between posts recently - I've been working from the library where there are very few opportunities to blog... but, I do get a lot done, so that's good!
Anyway, this is an essay I wrote a while back, in timed conditions, which my teacher has graded at a Level 5, which is the top band of a grade A. I thought it might help you to see what this looks like, as well as helping remind me!
To what extent was destalinisation responsible for Khrushchev's fall from power?
The process of destalinisation, defined by Thatcher as "the elimination of Stakuinist excesses and policies as well as the cult of personality from Soviet politics, post-1953" was the root of many of Khrushchev's policies, and most notably those which faced most criticism or which failed most quickly.Therefore, it seems reasonable to take the view of many historians that it was the biggest contributor to his downfall, despite many other evident factors.
Destalinisation influenced almost all Khrushchev era policies, including the economic reforms he attempted. Despite fierce opposition, which ultimately lead to failure, decentralisation was attempted in order to rid the system of bureaucracy. However, as some have suggested that by the end of Khrushchev's regime, there was up to a third more bureaucracy then there had been previously, demonstrating the flaws in this policy, as well as causing the 1963 growth rate to plummet to less than that of 1933. This, having come only a year before Khrushchev was ousted and at the height of the East/West competition, must therefore be seen as a highly significant reason for the plot against Khrushchev. Bemo also suggests that the extent of bureaucratic reform failures may have lead to further opposition, only helping to build the case for Khrushchev's ousting.
The restructuring of the Stalinist system which came with destalinisation wrought most change in the political system, where Khrushchev split the party into agricultural and industrial wings in an attempt to bypass the Stalinist Gosplan system and bring about more coherence. Again, this caused significant opposition from the bureaucracy, as well as leading to confusion and what Filtzer describes as "bureaucratic anarchy", making it perfectly clear to all those in positions of power that Khrushchev's reforms were not working. The distaste this surely caused will only have been exacerbated by his moves to give the party, as opposed to the government, more control than it had had under Stalin, by stating that members could only hold positions of power for a set period, and by reducing benefits and privileges which came with powerful positions, a move later attempted by Gorbachev. Although Filtzer praises Khrushchev for "putting the party back at the centre of the political stage", the vested interests within the party were disrupted, causing many of these high up in the system to turn against him. The fact that this was the first set of reforms to be overturned by Brezhnev and Kosygin must also surely prove it as having been a significant factor in his ousting.
Another element which Thatcher describes as having been pivotal to Stalinism, "aggressive foreign policy", was amended under Khrushchev and through destalinisation, in what the West have termed as "the thaw". With hindsight, it is easy to see how Khrushchev's international exploits may always have had the USSR's best interests in mind, this was not the view shared by the party at the time. He may have become what Laver has called "truly an international statesman", but his presence at home in solving native issues was more of a concern within the Soviet Union, and many historians cite that this is a major reason that he was forced from power.
There were, of course, other reasons for Khrushchev being forced from power, one of the most notable being his failed agarian reforms. Stalin had been criticised early on for his failure to accept advice, and the secret speech had condemned collectivisation, however the Virgin Lands Scheme under Khrushchev was arguably the greatest agricultural failure since the revolution. Khrushchev, being from a rural background, claimed to have a good knowledge of agriculture and therefore embarked on what most historians recognise as a vast propaganda campaign, into which insufficient planning and too much funding was placed. Although the first year saw a significant boost in agricultural output, this began to plummet in subsequent years, proving to party members that Khrushchev's agricultural knowledge was little more than arrogance. Laver, therefore, suggests that this was a highly significant reson for Khrushchev's fall from power.
Another vast blow which most accept as having vastly catalysed Khrushchev's fall from power was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which came just two years before Khrushchev eventually fell from power. Although with hindsight it is possible to see that the agreement made with US President Kennedy was beneficial to both the USA and the USSR, the only clauses officially disclosed suggested a victory in diplomacy for America. Coming as this did at arguably the most tense period of the Cold War, it appeared to many within the USSR that Khrushchev simply was not a strong enough leader and that 'backing down' to the USA was the ultimate proof of weakness. Historians agree almost unanimously that this was a highly significant event in the lead up to Khrushchev's fall from power.
However, perhaps the most significant proof that destalinisation was ultimately responsible for Khrushchev's fall from power comes in the manner in which he was ousted: peacefully, by the demands of his colleagues, who would surely not have dared to do the same under Stalin. Although destalinisation did not aim to end the strict control of the population (as demonstrated in Hungary in 1956), it did bring about the end of totalitarianism in the USSR, through a series of legal and cultural reforms, the relative successes of which are, in the West, generally deemed positive. Therefore, as Khrushchev himself has stated, he brought about the end of the total fear within the party, and, despite other contributing factors, this can be seen to prove that destalinisation was ultimately responsible for his fall from power in 1964.
So, hope that helps! :) More essay plans are a-comin'! :)
- HistGrrl xx
Showing posts with label Khrushchev. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Khrushchev. Show all posts
13 June 2010
7 June 2010
Themes: Social change
I'm not going to look at specific elements within social change independently, but rather have come up with this rather lovely table for you. Click to see it larger :)
Print it and learn it :)
- HistGrrl x
Print it and learn it :)
- HistGrrl x
Themes: Leaderships
The comparison of leaderships makes up a large part of the analysis of political change.
Stalin
- strong, decisive leadership which commanded respect
- ideology
- brutal, dictatorial, paranoid, resistant to change
- rigid control and denial of outside influences
- death toll & purges
- economy strong but extremely rigid and controlled
- no dissent because no dissent tolerated
Khrushchev
- popular, accepting of reform and more humane
- unpredictable, coarse and indecisive
- dismantled Stalinism
- peaceful co-existence
- ignored party responsibility for crimes
- economic failures
Brezhnev
- stable, reliable
- poor judgement, conservative, corrupt
- abuse of system
- cult of personality
- treatment of peasants
- stagnation
- ideology lost meaning
Gorbachev
- more liberal and Western
- recognised need for change
- indecisive, inconsistent, hesitant
- opened society
- more realistic defence and foreign policy
- contribution to break-up
- not an economist
I was going to put pictures of the leaders on this post, but I thought it might scare away my readers. Eeek...
Interesting thought: Russian leaders alternate - bald, had hair, bald, had hair etc
Lenin - bald
Stalin - had hair
Khrushchev - bald
Brezhnev - had hair
Andropov - bald
Chernenko - had hair
Gorbachev - bald
That's... um, interesting, right? And, um, of course, highly significant to their leaderships...
- HistGrrl?
Stalin
- strong, decisive leadership which commanded respect
- ideology
- brutal, dictatorial, paranoid, resistant to change
- rigid control and denial of outside influences
- death toll & purges
- economy strong but extremely rigid and controlled
- no dissent because no dissent tolerated
Khrushchev
- popular, accepting of reform and more humane
- unpredictable, coarse and indecisive
- dismantled Stalinism
- peaceful co-existence
- ignored party responsibility for crimes
- economic failures
Brezhnev
- stable, reliable
- poor judgement, conservative, corrupt
- abuse of system
- cult of personality
- treatment of peasants
- stagnation
- ideology lost meaning
Gorbachev
- more liberal and Western
- recognised need for change
- indecisive, inconsistent, hesitant
- opened society
- more realistic defence and foreign policy
- contribution to break-up
- not an economist
I was going to put pictures of the leaders on this post, but I thought it might scare away my readers. Eeek...
Interesting thought: Russian leaders alternate - bald, had hair, bald, had hair etc
Lenin - bald
Stalin - had hair
Khrushchev - bald
Brezhnev - had hair
Andropov - bald
Chernenko - had hair
Gorbachev - bald
That's... um, interesting, right? And, um, of course, highly significant to their leaderships...
- HistGrrl?
6 June 2010
Themes: The Role of Stalinism
Assessing whether Stalinism was maintained after Stalin's death, and to what extent, is a very simple and somewhat likely exam question - and would definitely be my preferred thematic exam question!
(Remind yourself of how I define Stalinism HERE)
So, to what extent was it maintained after Stalin's death? This time, we're looking by element of Stalinism, not by leader.
Dictatorship of one man
- arguably all leaders post-Stalin lead in this way
- Khrushchev and Malenkov in the collective leadership
- the party's desire, post-Khrushchev, not to let any one leader hold so much power again
- Brezhnev chosen as a "man of the centre" (Tompson)
- Brezhnev's willingness to ask for advice
- Khrushchev's outsting
- Gorbachev's more liberal, Western viewpoint, and the fact that he had political opposition
Cult of personality
- Brezhnev arguably had one; "a personality cult without a personality" (Tompson)
- Khrushchev was accused of building one
- Khrushchev and Brezhnev's assumptions of all Stalin's old positions
Dominant ideology
- LAVER: "Ideology had simply lost its meaning to many within the USSR by 1982"
- not seen as so dominant in ever after Stalin's death
Command Economy
- Brezhnev's inability to remove Gosplain
- Khrushchev's separation of ind/ag
- Gorbachev's desire for "a free market within the confines of a state-controlled economy"
- the dominance of FYPs
Aggressive Foreign Policy
- Warsaw Pact
- "The Thaw"
- SALT
- Détente
- Afghanistan
- Brezhnev Doctrine
- Helsinki
- Regan/Bush and Gorbachev
- USSR joining the UN
- end of the Cold War
Use of terror
- Khrushchev-era legal reforms
- Dissidence and Brezhnev
- End of "reign of fear" - Khrushchev ousted, for eg
- Purges on same scale never happened again
So, was Stalinism maintained in the USSR after Stalin's death? I think we can almost categorically agree not.
Now, have a break. I feel like I need one; you do too! :)
- HistGrrl x
(Remind yourself of how I define Stalinism HERE)
So, to what extent was it maintained after Stalin's death? This time, we're looking by element of Stalinism, not by leader.
Dictatorship of one man
- arguably all leaders post-Stalin lead in this way
- Khrushchev and Malenkov in the collective leadership
- the party's desire, post-Khrushchev, not to let any one leader hold so much power again
- Brezhnev chosen as a "man of the centre" (Tompson)
- Brezhnev's willingness to ask for advice
- Khrushchev's outsting
- Gorbachev's more liberal, Western viewpoint, and the fact that he had political opposition
Cult of personality
- Brezhnev arguably had one; "a personality cult without a personality" (Tompson)
- Khrushchev was accused of building one
- Khrushchev and Brezhnev's assumptions of all Stalin's old positions
Dominant ideology
- LAVER: "Ideology had simply lost its meaning to many within the USSR by 1982"
- not seen as so dominant in ever after Stalin's death
Command Economy
- Brezhnev's inability to remove Gosplain
- Khrushchev's separation of ind/ag
- Gorbachev's desire for "a free market within the confines of a state-controlled economy"
- the dominance of FYPs
Aggressive Foreign Policy
- Warsaw Pact
- "The Thaw"
- SALT
- Détente
- Afghanistan
- Brezhnev Doctrine
- Helsinki
- Regan/Bush and Gorbachev
- USSR joining the UN
- end of the Cold War
Use of terror
- Khrushchev-era legal reforms
- Dissidence and Brezhnev
- End of "reign of fear" - Khrushchev ousted, for eg
- Purges on same scale never happened again
So, was Stalinism maintained in the USSR after Stalin's death? I think we can almost categorically agree not.
Now, have a break. I feel like I need one; you do too! :)
- HistGrrl x
Themes: Economy
The Soviet Economy is a topic highly likely to come up, and so an understanding of it and themes within it is very important.
I'm going to look at a few key dates in detail to help spot trends.
1941 - how prepared were the USSR for war?
The top line shows 1941 levels of industrial production and the bottom line shows 1942.
- Gosplan, FYPs and collectivisation prepared the USSR for war
- strong armaments industry
- industry in less vulnerable areas
- central planning system well geared towards war
- HOWEVER 1942 statistics show how badly the invasion hit the USSR & how it caused serious damage to industrial infrastructure
- agriculture was similarly hit because of the "scorched Earth" and German advances through Ukraine
1950 - how well had the USSR recovered from war?
Purple bars show 1950 statistics; green show 1950 plan targets; red show 1945 stats; and blue show 1940.
- for the most part, the Soviet economy recovered bizarrely well from the war
- 1940 quotas were always exceeded by 1950 & most of the 1950 plan targets were, too
- quantitative statistics, not qualitative
- propaganda projects
- agricultural production up on 1945, but down on 1940
- scorched Earth damage
- NOVE: "agriculture, in Stalin's final years, was characterised by excessive centralisation of decision, insufficient investment, extremely low prices and ill-judged intentions"
1965 - how successful were Khrushchev's reforms?
Blue shows 1958; red shows 1965 targets; green shows 1965 actual results
- supposed failures not as bad as is often claimed
- agriculture characterised by campaignist schemes
- confusion of bureaucracy and changes to it
- ind/ag wings left added complications
1985 - how far was the economy declining?
The weird cream colour is 1981-85; maroon is 1976-80; and purple is 1971-75
- lack of investment/innovation
- conservatism
- black market
- lack of regard for environmental concerns
- tried to replace Gosplan, but was not successful
- little put into economy = little comes out (ind)
- agriculture received significant investment, which came to nothing
1991 - economy in crisis?
Blue is national income (what people were paid); red is industrial out-put; green is agricultural out-put
- even official Soviet statistics showed significant decline in growth, and even genuine economic decline
- indecision
- Gorbachev was not an economisy
- the party lost economic control
Shocking final statistics to leave you with a true sense of the desperation of the Soviet Economy...
Growth rates 1960-1985
Blue is Soviet statistics; red is American estimates; green is a leading Soviet economist, Kahin.
All show the economy to be declining at unprecedented rates.
Why did the economy decline so drastically, though?
- indecision
- inability to modify the Stalinist system
- vested interests in the bureaucracy
- the extent of the bureaucracy
- falling birth rates and lack of people to work
- lack of environmental concern
- absenteeism and alcoholism
- determination that the system that existed was the right one
- the role of the black market and the mafia
- lack of trading partners, once the Eastern Bloc began to turn away from the USSR
- loss of party control over the economy under Gorbachev
And... that's the economy done.
Questions, as ever, are welcome. I still can't believe I understood and created all those graphs! Statistics used sourced from Laver textbook on the era.
- HistGrrl x
PS - email me if you want full-size copies of the graphs, and I will transfer them over GoogleDocs.
I'm going to look at a few key dates in detail to help spot trends.
1941 - how prepared were the USSR for war?
The top line shows 1941 levels of industrial production and the bottom line shows 1942.
- Gosplan, FYPs and collectivisation prepared the USSR for war
- strong armaments industry
- industry in less vulnerable areas
- central planning system well geared towards war
- HOWEVER 1942 statistics show how badly the invasion hit the USSR & how it caused serious damage to industrial infrastructure
- agriculture was similarly hit because of the "scorched Earth" and German advances through Ukraine
1950 - how well had the USSR recovered from war?
Purple bars show 1950 statistics; green show 1950 plan targets; red show 1945 stats; and blue show 1940.
- for the most part, the Soviet economy recovered bizarrely well from the war
- 1940 quotas were always exceeded by 1950 & most of the 1950 plan targets were, too
- quantitative statistics, not qualitative
- propaganda projects
- agricultural production up on 1945, but down on 1940
- scorched Earth damage
- NOVE: "agriculture, in Stalin's final years, was characterised by excessive centralisation of decision, insufficient investment, extremely low prices and ill-judged intentions"
1965 - how successful were Khrushchev's reforms?
Blue shows 1958; red shows 1965 targets; green shows 1965 actual results
- supposed failures not as bad as is often claimed
- agriculture characterised by campaignist schemes
- confusion of bureaucracy and changes to it
- ind/ag wings left added complications
1985 - how far was the economy declining?
The weird cream colour is 1981-85; maroon is 1976-80; and purple is 1971-75
- lack of investment/innovation
- conservatism
- black market
- lack of regard for environmental concerns
- tried to replace Gosplan, but was not successful
- little put into economy = little comes out (ind)
- agriculture received significant investment, which came to nothing
1991 - economy in crisis?
Blue is national income (what people were paid); red is industrial out-put; green is agricultural out-put
- even official Soviet statistics showed significant decline in growth, and even genuine economic decline
- indecision
- Gorbachev was not an economisy
- the party lost economic control
Shocking final statistics to leave you with a true sense of the desperation of the Soviet Economy...
Growth rates 1960-1985
Blue is Soviet statistics; red is American estimates; green is a leading Soviet economist, Kahin.
All show the economy to be declining at unprecedented rates.
Why did the economy decline so drastically, though?
- indecision
- inability to modify the Stalinist system
- vested interests in the bureaucracy
- the extent of the bureaucracy
- falling birth rates and lack of people to work
- lack of environmental concern
- absenteeism and alcoholism
- determination that the system that existed was the right one
- the role of the black market and the mafia
- lack of trading partners, once the Eastern Bloc began to turn away from the USSR
- loss of party control over the economy under Gorbachev
And... that's the economy done.
Questions, as ever, are welcome. I still can't believe I understood and created all those graphs! Statistics used sourced from Laver textbook on the era.
- HistGrrl x
PS - email me if you want full-size copies of the graphs, and I will transfer them over GoogleDocs.
5 June 2010
Themes: Position of the CPSU
In this post, I'm going to examine the changing position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) throughout the period 1941-1991. It's vague - but remember, you only have 45 minutes to cover fifty years. You can't go into too much detail and still be analytical!
Remember to differentiate between the PARTY and the GOVERNMENT. At certain points, they were synonymous, but at certain points they were completely different.
The changing role will be judged by leader, and "govt" is short-hand for "government".
Stalin
- dominant
- all-powerful
- congresses rarely met
- economic and social control rigid and complete (Gosplan, Zhadnovshchina etc)
- Govt and party synonymous
Khrushchev
- FILTZER: "It was Khrushchev who placed the party back at the centre of the political stage"
- moves to consolidate his own power gave the party more power
- split into industrial and agricultural wings
- legal reforms meant it had less control over people's lives
- government and party organs became more seperate
Brezhnev
- reversal of Khrushchev's reforms
- Nomenklachura and stability of cadres
- LAVER: "ideology had all but lost its meaning to many within the USSR by 1982"
Andropov
- anti-corruption drive to take power back from the mafia
Gorbachev
- law and party separated
- couldn't hold a state and party position
- membership fell by 3 million in 1990
- removal of incentives
- BRESLAUR: "Gorbachev refused to recognise that Yeltsin and the radicals were the future"
- economic control revoked 1988
- CPSU banned in aftermath of coup
- emergence of other parties
Specialist terminology has been used in this post - if you don't know it, please feel free to ask! :)
And... that's one theme down!
- HistGrrl x
Remember to differentiate between the PARTY and the GOVERNMENT. At certain points, they were synonymous, but at certain points they were completely different.
The changing role will be judged by leader, and "govt" is short-hand for "government".
Stalin
- dominant
- all-powerful
- congresses rarely met
- economic and social control rigid and complete (Gosplan, Zhadnovshchina etc)
- Govt and party synonymous
Khrushchev
- FILTZER: "It was Khrushchev who placed the party back at the centre of the political stage"
- moves to consolidate his own power gave the party more power
- split into industrial and agricultural wings
- legal reforms meant it had less control over people's lives
- government and party organs became more seperate
Brezhnev
- reversal of Khrushchev's reforms
- Nomenklachura and stability of cadres
- LAVER: "ideology had all but lost its meaning to many within the USSR by 1982"
Andropov
- anti-corruption drive to take power back from the mafia
Gorbachev
- law and party separated
- couldn't hold a state and party position
- membership fell by 3 million in 1990
- removal of incentives
- BRESLAUR: "Gorbachev refused to recognise that Yeltsin and the radicals were the future"
- economic control revoked 1988
- CPSU banned in aftermath of coup
- emergence of other parties
Specialist terminology has been used in this post - if you don't know it, please feel free to ask! :)
And... that's one theme down!
- HistGrrl x
4 June 2010
Unit Two - Destalinisation (part three)
Back again! Make sure you're ready for this - because pretty soon, it gets even more boring. Yes, pretty soon, we're tackling B-R-E-Z-H-N-E-V... *shudders*
Anyway. On with the show. :)
Ousting Khrushchev
ANTI-PARTY CONSPIRACY
- May 1957, majority of Presidium members threatened to demote Khrushchev
- Zhukov stood against them and said the military would intervene without a vote
- plotters gave in and Khrushchev had them removed from the Presidium
CHANGES POST-CONSPIRACY
- Khrushchev's supporters in key positions
- became Commander-in-Chief
- held all Stalin's old positions
- established a system where a % of the powerful positions had to be re-elected each Congress
OUSTING KHRUSHCHEV
- reforms failed; concerns
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- called to a Presidium meeting in october 1964 and presented with a list of his own short-comings
- no supporters came forward; he resigned
What were the main effects of the Anti-party conspiracy and Khrushchev's downfall?
Criticisms of Khrushchev
...OF PERSONALITY AND STYLE
- disliked
- brash
- opportunist
- seen as building a cult-of-personality
- too focussed on foreign relations
...OF INTERNAL POLICY
- party reforms too radical
- economic growth declined
- agriculture still failing
- bad consumer goods
- nuclear expenditure annoyed army
...OF FOREIGN POLICY
- 1956 Suez Crisis
- provocative Berlin policy
- 3rd world aid brought no benefits
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- destalinisation caused problems in the Eastern Bloc and China
- general conduct upset colleagues
What was the main reason for Khrushchev's fall from power?
So, that's Khrushchev been and gone! On to Brezhnev...
(You might want to find yourself a stiff whisky before the next blog. I warn you in advance... *shudders*)
- HistGrrl x
Anyway. On with the show. :)
Ousting Khrushchev
ANTI-PARTY CONSPIRACY
- May 1957, majority of Presidium members threatened to demote Khrushchev
- Zhukov stood against them and said the military would intervene without a vote
- plotters gave in and Khrushchev had them removed from the Presidium
CHANGES POST-CONSPIRACY
- Khrushchev's supporters in key positions
- became Commander-in-Chief
- held all Stalin's old positions
- established a system where a % of the powerful positions had to be re-elected each Congress
OUSTING KHRUSHCHEV
- reforms failed; concerns
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- called to a Presidium meeting in october 1964 and presented with a list of his own short-comings
- no supporters came forward; he resigned
What were the main effects of the Anti-party conspiracy and Khrushchev's downfall?
Criticisms of Khrushchev
...OF PERSONALITY AND STYLE
- disliked
- brash
- opportunist
- seen as building a cult-of-personality
- too focussed on foreign relations
...OF INTERNAL POLICY
- party reforms too radical
- economic growth declined
- agriculture still failing
- bad consumer goods
- nuclear expenditure annoyed army
...OF FOREIGN POLICY
- 1956 Suez Crisis
- provocative Berlin policy
- 3rd world aid brought no benefits
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- destalinisation caused problems in the Eastern Bloc and China
- general conduct upset colleagues
What was the main reason for Khrushchev's fall from power?
So, that's Khrushchev been and gone! On to Brezhnev...
(You might want to find yourself a stiff whisky before the next blog. I warn you in advance... *shudders*)
- HistGrrl x
Unit Two - Destalinisation (part two)
Back again with more Destalinisation - having taken a break to watch a lovely film and enjoy the sunshine! Hope you did too xx
Economic reform
MOTIVES
- over-taking the West
- improving major weaknesses in the Soviet system
- didn't want to rest on Stalinist fear
INDUSTRIAL REFORM
- decentralisation
- central planning remained
- 40% more investment in Eastern regions
- more consumer goods
- Gosplan functions divided
AGRICULTURAL REFORM
- Virgin Lands
- taxes on private plots reduced
- collectives merged with state farms
- fixed wages and state benefits for peasants
- city dwellers weren't allowed to keep cattle
INTERPRETATIONS
- LAVER: "Khrushchev's reforms did not really help the economy"
- FILTZER: "Bureaucratic anarchy"
How far did the Khrushchev reforms aid/hinder the economy? To what extent were they responsible for the Brezhnev era's stagnation?
Other Reforms
DESTALINISATION
- the removal of Stalinist excesses from Marxist doctrine
POLITICAL REFORMS
- restructuring and decentralisation
- LAVER: "The party diehards would not easily forgive Khrushchev for placing such obstacles in the path of traditional Soviet communism"
- FILTZER: "It was Khrushchev who placed the party back at the centre of the political stage"
CULTURAL REFORM
- 'reform communism' - move away from Zhadnov-era rigidity
- foreign culture allowed in and foreign visitors encouraged
- political prisoners released (some)
- cultural freedoms returned to writers and artists etc
LEGAL REFORM
- new legal code, Dec 1958
- defendants couldn't be convicted on confession alone
- 'Enemy Of The People' no longer a crime
- Comrade Courts tried minor crimes, but encouraged corruption
- death penalty reinstated, 1961, due to black market
What effect did Khrushchev's social reforms have on his standing within the party?
Limits to destalinisation
- writers could still be classified as dissidents
- Westernised behaviour rejected
- modern art rejected
- many liberal reforms revoked before Khrushchev fell from power
- persecution of radical/religious groups
- party still decided what was allowed
What did this prove about destalinisation?
Foreign relations
- Cuba
- Eastern Bloc; Poland, Hungary, Berlin
- Buffer states remained
- Warsaw Pact
- Khrushchev seen as having weakened the union
What effect did this have on Khrushchev's leadership?
Back soon with the process of ousting Khrushchev - yes, I know, it gets more and more exciting... *rolls eyes*
Have a cuppa. Again. And email a friend. And then come back to this! Fuuuuuun ;)
- HistGrrl x
Economic reform
MOTIVES
- over-taking the West
- improving major weaknesses in the Soviet system
- didn't want to rest on Stalinist fear
INDUSTRIAL REFORM
- decentralisation
- central planning remained
- 40% more investment in Eastern regions
- more consumer goods
- Gosplan functions divided
AGRICULTURAL REFORM
- Virgin Lands
- taxes on private plots reduced
- collectives merged with state farms
- fixed wages and state benefits for peasants
- city dwellers weren't allowed to keep cattle
INTERPRETATIONS
- LAVER: "Khrushchev's reforms did not really help the economy"
- FILTZER: "Bureaucratic anarchy"
How far did the Khrushchev reforms aid/hinder the economy? To what extent were they responsible for the Brezhnev era's stagnation?
Other Reforms
DESTALINISATION
- the removal of Stalinist excesses from Marxist doctrine
POLITICAL REFORMS
- restructuring and decentralisation
- LAVER: "The party diehards would not easily forgive Khrushchev for placing such obstacles in the path of traditional Soviet communism"
- FILTZER: "It was Khrushchev who placed the party back at the centre of the political stage"
CULTURAL REFORM
- 'reform communism' - move away from Zhadnov-era rigidity
- foreign culture allowed in and foreign visitors encouraged
- political prisoners released (some)
- cultural freedoms returned to writers and artists etc
LEGAL REFORM
- new legal code, Dec 1958
- defendants couldn't be convicted on confession alone
- 'Enemy Of The People' no longer a crime
- Comrade Courts tried minor crimes, but encouraged corruption
- death penalty reinstated, 1961, due to black market
What effect did Khrushchev's social reforms have on his standing within the party?
Limits to destalinisation
- writers could still be classified as dissidents
- Westernised behaviour rejected
- modern art rejected
- many liberal reforms revoked before Khrushchev fell from power
- persecution of radical/religious groups
- party still decided what was allowed
What did this prove about destalinisation?
Foreign relations
- Cuba
- Eastern Bloc; Poland, Hungary, Berlin
- Buffer states remained
- Warsaw Pact
- Khrushchev seen as having weakened the union
What effect did this have on Khrushchev's leadership?
Back soon with the process of ousting Khrushchev - yes, I know, it gets more and more exciting... *rolls eyes*
Have a cuppa. Again. And email a friend. And then come back to this! Fuuuuuun ;)
- HistGrrl x
Unit Two - Destalinisation (part one)
Emergence of new leaders after Stalin's death
A joint leadership existed for a time, but new leaders rapidly fought their corner.
KHRUSHCHEV
- down to Earth
- took initiative
- power-base
- listened to and respected
- visited provinces and met people
- lucky
- crude and unsophisticated
- over estimated himself
- not good at seeing the "bigger picture"
MALENKOV
- educated
- friendly with Stalin
- promised higher living standards
- friendly with Beria
- less concerned with limelight
- hated by some important colleagues
- errors of judgement
BULGANIN
- prominent in party
- lacked political skill
- powerful enemies
BERIA
- hated
- ruthless
Which leader had the better qualities for leadership at this point?
Power struggle
- collective leadership took over after Stalin's death, with Beria and Malenkov in positions of greatest power
- Beria brought down in a coup while in Berlin; lack of power-base made him an easy target and he was arrested and shot in June 1953
- Khrushchev used party roles to seize initiative
- left Khrushchev and Malenkov to secure power
KHRUSHCHEV AND MALENKOV
- Malenkov in state and government administration
- Khrushchev in party and used power-base to ensure party dominated government
- different economic approaches - Khrushchev's was more Stalinist and thus what the party wanted
- Khrushchev more ambitious than Malenkov
- Feb 1955, Malenkov resigns, and Khrushchev establishes dominance
To what extent does Khrushchev's rise to power echo Stalin's?
Secret Speech, 20th Congress of the CPSU, 1956
BACKGROUND
- Khrushchev needed to consolidate his leadership and this was an easy way to do it
- 20th Congress, 1956, closed speech to delegates only
THE SPEECH
- denounced excesses of Stalinism
- Stalin's behaviour declared to be out of touch with Marxism-Leninism
- Limitaions - wrong-doings pre 1934 ignored, focus on Stalin not the party, no suggestion of flaws in the system, not blue-print for the future, accepted 'correctness' of major policies
REACTIONS
- 1/2 1956 CC admitted post 1952; new members admitted to make up for anti-Khrushchev reactions
- LAVER: "The essential features of Stalinism survived intact"
What impact was the Secret Speech to have?
Breaking Destalinisation down to save us all from dying of boredom! Have a break; have a coffee; eat a biscuit and see you soon! :)
- HistGrrl x
A joint leadership existed for a time, but new leaders rapidly fought their corner.
KHRUSHCHEV
- down to Earth
- took initiative
- power-base
- listened to and respected
- visited provinces and met people
- lucky
- crude and unsophisticated
- over estimated himself
- not good at seeing the "bigger picture"
MALENKOV
- educated
- friendly with Stalin
- promised higher living standards
- friendly with Beria
- less concerned with limelight
- hated by some important colleagues
- errors of judgement
BULGANIN
- prominent in party
- lacked political skill
- powerful enemies
BERIA
- hated
- ruthless
Which leader had the better qualities for leadership at this point?
Power struggle
- collective leadership took over after Stalin's death, with Beria and Malenkov in positions of greatest power
- Beria brought down in a coup while in Berlin; lack of power-base made him an easy target and he was arrested and shot in June 1953
- Khrushchev used party roles to seize initiative
- left Khrushchev and Malenkov to secure power
KHRUSHCHEV AND MALENKOV
- Malenkov in state and government administration
- Khrushchev in party and used power-base to ensure party dominated government
- different economic approaches - Khrushchev's was more Stalinist and thus what the party wanted
- Khrushchev more ambitious than Malenkov
- Feb 1955, Malenkov resigns, and Khrushchev establishes dominance
To what extent does Khrushchev's rise to power echo Stalin's?
Secret Speech, 20th Congress of the CPSU, 1956
BACKGROUND
- Khrushchev needed to consolidate his leadership and this was an easy way to do it
- 20th Congress, 1956, closed speech to delegates only
THE SPEECH
- denounced excesses of Stalinism
- Stalin's behaviour declared to be out of touch with Marxism-Leninism
- Limitaions - wrong-doings pre 1934 ignored, focus on Stalin not the party, no suggestion of flaws in the system, not blue-print for the future, accepted 'correctness' of major policies
REACTIONS
- 1/2 1956 CC admitted post 1952; new members admitted to make up for anti-Khrushchev reactions
- LAVER: "The essential features of Stalinism survived intact"
What impact was the Secret Speech to have?
Breaking Destalinisation down to save us all from dying of boredom! Have a break; have a coffee; eat a biscuit and see you soon! :)
- HistGrrl x
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