This is a horrible essay because of the wording of the question. I've planned it on paper, but it's atrocious, so I'm trying again here to see what happens. Inability to articulate ideas today may have something to do with the fact that I sat an exam this morning and am feeling a little bit more than a little bit fried...
"Perestroika was a disaster because it brought down a system that people had learned to live with without putting anything substantial in its place" - To what extent to you agree?
Historians agree almost unanimously that Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika, introduced in 1987 to 'restructure' (and thus reinvigorate) the Soviet economy, was a disaster by 1991: as Laver states, "Perestroika appeared to be making things worse". It can thus be seen to have brought down the Soviet Union because of the discontent it caused amongst a population who knew no other system and who saw "nothing substantial in its place". However, it can also be seen as a disaster because of the rifts it caused within the communist party, and because of the vast economic failures it caused, which are also commonly seen as having caused the break-up of the USSR.
Yes - that's why it was a disaster
- LAVER: "Over the previous decade or more, many people had increasingly benefitted from the existing system" - living conditions, full employment etc
- POPOLOV: "It was done with slogans, not a programme of reform that ordinary Russians could understand"
- Attempts to create a market economy in state confines would never work and were always going to cause problems
- People began to see the weaknesses in the system
- Caused general strikes in the nationalities because nothing solid was there
- Rise of other parties (for same reaons)
- Yeltsin (see above)
No - it was a disaster for other reasons
- Made no attempt to tackle legacy of corruption
- Confusing administrative changes
- Devaluation of rouble; 15% decrease in production
- Agriculture ignored
- Rifts within the party inherently weakened the system and allowed Yeltsin and the radicals in
It cannot be doubted that "perestroika was a disaster", and, although there are many reasons for this, the fact that it weakened the system and lead to general discontent because no new system replaced it is perhaps the most significant of these reasons. As Gorbachev said in his final speech as leader of the USSR, before it seceded to the Russian Federation, "the old system collapsed before the new one could begin to function".
If anyone could tell me if that makes sense, I would be eternally grateful!
- HistGrrl x
Showing posts with label 1991. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1991. Show all posts
9 June 2010
7 June 2010
Themes: Nationalist Tension
Nationalist tension has always existed within the USSR, and has always been a cause of instability and a worry to leaders. As with some other topics, we'll investigate the war and the "High Stalinism" period separately.
The War Years
- Jews, Tartars and other minority nationalities treated with hostility and suspicion
- worries that they'd ally with the Nazis
- many deported to Siberia or rounded up and sent to labour camps
- the fight for "Mother Russia" alienated many
- Nazi treatment of Jews and Slavs commonly seen as having been a major cause of Nazi loss (believed them subhuman so wouldn't allow them to fight for the Reich)
- Tartar exile 1944; Keys suggests was one of the only rational racial exiles, as many had actually allied with the Nazis - entire Tartar race (200 000 people exiled to Central Asia, with 40 000 dying on the way)
- most were fully involved in Soviet war effort
- 'Guilty by association'
- LAVER: "Stalin was obsessed with a supposed national threat"
High Stalinism
- wartime paranoia continues
- national tensions kept at bay by totalitarian nature of regime
Khrushchev
- LAVER: "through nationalist reform, the USSR was also discouraged"
- Poland and Hungary, 1956
- Warsaw Pact
- break from Stalinist cultural control
- Stalinist treatment of religious groups (eg Jews wanting to emigrate to Israel)
Brezhnev
- Stagnation & poor economic growth lead to rises in national tension, especially from the better of nationalities who did not wish to be associated with Russia
- Helsinki accords lead to hope of reform
- Dissidence more potent amongst national minorities
- Prague Spring
- LAVER: "If there was a national threat then Brezhnev did not solve it"
- Deliberate 'russification' or republics/letting sleeping dogs lie
- Brezhnev Doctrine
- Olympics lead to campaign of Soviet nationalism
Gorbachev and the collapse of the USSR
- 'Glasnost' lead to hopes of national freedom
- Economic failure and 'left over' dissatisfaction lead to increased growth in nationalism
- fuelled by political moves to democracy
- LAVER: "a timebomb waiting to explode"
- break up began in nationalities
- August Coup lead many nationalities to claim independence
- CIS
- break up of Warsaw pact
- Lithuania
- trigger cause of collapse of USSR?
How significant a threat were nationalities all along?
Many historians have speculated that the national threat which came to dominate Soviet politics towards the end of the USSR had been long-existent and that it had simply reacted particularly harshly to more political freedoms and to drastic economic conditions. The threat was clearly present in some nationalities, such as Ukraine, since well before the Second World War, when Ukrainian peasants fought especially potently against the collectivisation drive; and the fact that most historians agree that the moment Ukraine seceded was essentially the moment that the USSR fell suggests that this long-existent tension was incredibly important in the collapse of the USSR.
The tensions in the Baltic states which were taken during WW2 were certainly the strongest, as they had the longest tradition of independence and were most able to remember the pre-Soviet era: thus the fact that Gorbachev's one attempt to halt secession happened as he sent tanks into Lithuania suggests that even the regime saw these as the greatest threat.
The threat of religious races has also been seen as highly significant, with the only major threat from within the USSR, under Khrushchev, being from the highly repressed Jews wishing to emigrate to their newly formed republic of Israel. Religious tensions also exacerbated problems within the Asian republics under Brezhnev, as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan faced particularly harsh repression as well as strong economic incentives to conform, with much investment being given to these.
Hope this helps! That's pretty much half your essay written for you because I got a little carried away!
Much love xo
- HistGrrl x
The War Years
- Jews, Tartars and other minority nationalities treated with hostility and suspicion
- worries that they'd ally with the Nazis
- many deported to Siberia or rounded up and sent to labour camps
- the fight for "Mother Russia" alienated many
- Nazi treatment of Jews and Slavs commonly seen as having been a major cause of Nazi loss (believed them subhuman so wouldn't allow them to fight for the Reich)
- Tartar exile 1944; Keys suggests was one of the only rational racial exiles, as many had actually allied with the Nazis - entire Tartar race (200 000 people exiled to Central Asia, with 40 000 dying on the way)
- most were fully involved in Soviet war effort
- 'Guilty by association'
- LAVER: "Stalin was obsessed with a supposed national threat"
High Stalinism
- wartime paranoia continues
- national tensions kept at bay by totalitarian nature of regime
Khrushchev
- LAVER: "through nationalist reform, the USSR was also discouraged"
- Poland and Hungary, 1956
- Warsaw Pact
- break from Stalinist cultural control
- Stalinist treatment of religious groups (eg Jews wanting to emigrate to Israel)
Brezhnev
- Stagnation & poor economic growth lead to rises in national tension, especially from the better of nationalities who did not wish to be associated with Russia
- Helsinki accords lead to hope of reform
- Dissidence more potent amongst national minorities
- Prague Spring
- LAVER: "If there was a national threat then Brezhnev did not solve it"
- Deliberate 'russification' or republics/letting sleeping dogs lie
- Brezhnev Doctrine
- Olympics lead to campaign of Soviet nationalism
Gorbachev and the collapse of the USSR
- 'Glasnost' lead to hopes of national freedom
- Economic failure and 'left over' dissatisfaction lead to increased growth in nationalism
- fuelled by political moves to democracy
- LAVER: "a timebomb waiting to explode"
- break up began in nationalities
- August Coup lead many nationalities to claim independence
- CIS
- break up of Warsaw pact
- Lithuania
- trigger cause of collapse of USSR?
How significant a threat were nationalities all along?
Many historians have speculated that the national threat which came to dominate Soviet politics towards the end of the USSR had been long-existent and that it had simply reacted particularly harshly to more political freedoms and to drastic economic conditions. The threat was clearly present in some nationalities, such as Ukraine, since well before the Second World War, when Ukrainian peasants fought especially potently against the collectivisation drive; and the fact that most historians agree that the moment Ukraine seceded was essentially the moment that the USSR fell suggests that this long-existent tension was incredibly important in the collapse of the USSR.
The tensions in the Baltic states which were taken during WW2 were certainly the strongest, as they had the longest tradition of independence and were most able to remember the pre-Soviet era: thus the fact that Gorbachev's one attempt to halt secession happened as he sent tanks into Lithuania suggests that even the regime saw these as the greatest threat.
The threat of religious races has also been seen as highly significant, with the only major threat from within the USSR, under Khrushchev, being from the highly repressed Jews wishing to emigrate to their newly formed republic of Israel. Religious tensions also exacerbated problems within the Asian republics under Brezhnev, as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan faced particularly harsh repression as well as strong economic incentives to conform, with much investment being given to these.
Hope this helps! That's pretty much half your essay written for you because I got a little carried away!
Much love xo
- HistGrrl x
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6 June 2010
Themes: Economy
The Soviet Economy is a topic highly likely to come up, and so an understanding of it and themes within it is very important.
I'm going to look at a few key dates in detail to help spot trends.
1941 - how prepared were the USSR for war?
The top line shows 1941 levels of industrial production and the bottom line shows 1942.
- Gosplan, FYPs and collectivisation prepared the USSR for war
- strong armaments industry
- industry in less vulnerable areas
- central planning system well geared towards war
- HOWEVER 1942 statistics show how badly the invasion hit the USSR & how it caused serious damage to industrial infrastructure
- agriculture was similarly hit because of the "scorched Earth" and German advances through Ukraine
1950 - how well had the USSR recovered from war?
Purple bars show 1950 statistics; green show 1950 plan targets; red show 1945 stats; and blue show 1940.
- for the most part, the Soviet economy recovered bizarrely well from the war
- 1940 quotas were always exceeded by 1950 & most of the 1950 plan targets were, too
- quantitative statistics, not qualitative
- propaganda projects
- agricultural production up on 1945, but down on 1940
- scorched Earth damage
- NOVE: "agriculture, in Stalin's final years, was characterised by excessive centralisation of decision, insufficient investment, extremely low prices and ill-judged intentions"
1965 - how successful were Khrushchev's reforms?
Blue shows 1958; red shows 1965 targets; green shows 1965 actual results
- supposed failures not as bad as is often claimed
- agriculture characterised by campaignist schemes
- confusion of bureaucracy and changes to it
- ind/ag wings left added complications
1985 - how far was the economy declining?
The weird cream colour is 1981-85; maroon is 1976-80; and purple is 1971-75
- lack of investment/innovation
- conservatism
- black market
- lack of regard for environmental concerns
- tried to replace Gosplan, but was not successful
- little put into economy = little comes out (ind)
- agriculture received significant investment, which came to nothing
1991 - economy in crisis?
Blue is national income (what people were paid); red is industrial out-put; green is agricultural out-put
- even official Soviet statistics showed significant decline in growth, and even genuine economic decline
- indecision
- Gorbachev was not an economisy
- the party lost economic control
Shocking final statistics to leave you with a true sense of the desperation of the Soviet Economy...
Growth rates 1960-1985
Blue is Soviet statistics; red is American estimates; green is a leading Soviet economist, Kahin.
All show the economy to be declining at unprecedented rates.
Why did the economy decline so drastically, though?
- indecision
- inability to modify the Stalinist system
- vested interests in the bureaucracy
- the extent of the bureaucracy
- falling birth rates and lack of people to work
- lack of environmental concern
- absenteeism and alcoholism
- determination that the system that existed was the right one
- the role of the black market and the mafia
- lack of trading partners, once the Eastern Bloc began to turn away from the USSR
- loss of party control over the economy under Gorbachev
And... that's the economy done.
Questions, as ever, are welcome. I still can't believe I understood and created all those graphs! Statistics used sourced from Laver textbook on the era.
- HistGrrl x
PS - email me if you want full-size copies of the graphs, and I will transfer them over GoogleDocs.
I'm going to look at a few key dates in detail to help spot trends.
1941 - how prepared were the USSR for war?
The top line shows 1941 levels of industrial production and the bottom line shows 1942.
- Gosplan, FYPs and collectivisation prepared the USSR for war
- strong armaments industry
- industry in less vulnerable areas
- central planning system well geared towards war
- HOWEVER 1942 statistics show how badly the invasion hit the USSR & how it caused serious damage to industrial infrastructure
- agriculture was similarly hit because of the "scorched Earth" and German advances through Ukraine
1950 - how well had the USSR recovered from war?
Purple bars show 1950 statistics; green show 1950 plan targets; red show 1945 stats; and blue show 1940.
- for the most part, the Soviet economy recovered bizarrely well from the war
- 1940 quotas were always exceeded by 1950 & most of the 1950 plan targets were, too
- quantitative statistics, not qualitative
- propaganda projects
- agricultural production up on 1945, but down on 1940
- scorched Earth damage
- NOVE: "agriculture, in Stalin's final years, was characterised by excessive centralisation of decision, insufficient investment, extremely low prices and ill-judged intentions"
1965 - how successful were Khrushchev's reforms?
Blue shows 1958; red shows 1965 targets; green shows 1965 actual results
- supposed failures not as bad as is often claimed
- agriculture characterised by campaignist schemes
- confusion of bureaucracy and changes to it
- ind/ag wings left added complications
1985 - how far was the economy declining?
The weird cream colour is 1981-85; maroon is 1976-80; and purple is 1971-75
- lack of investment/innovation
- conservatism
- black market
- lack of regard for environmental concerns
- tried to replace Gosplan, but was not successful
- little put into economy = little comes out (ind)
- agriculture received significant investment, which came to nothing
1991 - economy in crisis?
Blue is national income (what people were paid); red is industrial out-put; green is agricultural out-put
- even official Soviet statistics showed significant decline in growth, and even genuine economic decline
- indecision
- Gorbachev was not an economisy
- the party lost economic control
Shocking final statistics to leave you with a true sense of the desperation of the Soviet Economy...
Growth rates 1960-1985
Blue is Soviet statistics; red is American estimates; green is a leading Soviet economist, Kahin.
All show the economy to be declining at unprecedented rates.
Why did the economy decline so drastically, though?
- indecision
- inability to modify the Stalinist system
- vested interests in the bureaucracy
- the extent of the bureaucracy
- falling birth rates and lack of people to work
- lack of environmental concern
- absenteeism and alcoholism
- determination that the system that existed was the right one
- the role of the black market and the mafia
- lack of trading partners, once the Eastern Bloc began to turn away from the USSR
- loss of party control over the economy under Gorbachev
And... that's the economy done.
Questions, as ever, are welcome. I still can't believe I understood and created all those graphs! Statistics used sourced from Laver textbook on the era.
- HistGrrl x
PS - email me if you want full-size copies of the graphs, and I will transfer them over GoogleDocs.
5 June 2010
Themes: Foreign Policy
When talking about Foreign Policy, you must ALWAYS talk about its significance within the USSR. Talking about it as a stand-alone element is neither relevant to the course, nor analytical. So, how did it affect leaderships and perceptions of leaders? Did it bring opposition or prove weakness?
As this theme is harder to analyse, I'm providing examples of short paragraphs of analysis after the information.
This theme is going to include the war as a separate element to High Stalinism - and I should probably warn you that I'm doing this one off the top of my head...
The Great Patriotic War
- working with the Allies
- suspicion of foreign powers
- against Germany, Norway and Finland
- A-Bomb
- "Soviet Sphere of Influence"
- Potsdam and Yalta conferences - the cause of the Cold War?
- Lend-Lease
The tensions created by the beginning of the cold war lead Stalin's regime to become even more internal and to spend a lot more on military and defence, dramatically effecting the economy. The Atomic Bomb also lead to changes in policy towards scientists and mathematicians, who were given more civil liberties in order to incentivise them.
High Stalinism
- THATCHER: "aggressive foreign policy"
- Aggression over East Berlin
- Defence spending rocketed
- Comecon
- Not involved in diplomacy with the rest of the world
- Seen as trying to "take over the world"
The internal nature of Stalin's regime at this time lead to distaste and bad feeling from the West, making later easing in relations even harder. However, the "percieved menace of the West" left Stalin with a suitable excuse to become more brutal in his internal policy, and lead him to be presented as a stronger leader, something that many historians agree Russians find necessary in their leaders - especially at this time, when memories of the Tsar were still existent.
Khrushchev
- the "thaw"
- U-2 incident
- Berlin Wall
- Start of the Vietnam War in earnest
- Warsaw Pact
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- economic aid to the third world
- alliance with China breaking down
- Sputnik and the space race
- Suez Crisis, 1956
Khrushchev's role in Soviet Foreign Policy is often seen as having been fatal because of the contradictions between the supposed "thaw" of destalinisation and the problems he caused with the West, over instances such as the building of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact and Cuban Missile Crisis. The "thaw" made him unpopular in the USSR, and his handling of these major events presented him as weak and aggressive both at home and abroad.
The effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis were especially fatal, given that clauses of the Kennedy/Khrushchev agreement which lead to the removal of US nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe were kept secret on the international stage, making it seem as though he had backed down, and thus presenting him as weak within the USSR. This is commonly seen as having been a major cause of his downfall.
Brezhnev
- SALT
- Détente
- Helsinki
- Moscow Olympics
- Afghanistan
- Brezhnev Doctrine
Laver has argued that "Brezhnev presided over a crucial period of Soviet Foreign Policy", given that his actions provoked distaste and opposition both within the USSR and abroad; although the initial SALT treaties and détente meetings were successful in the West as well as in the USSR, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 is often seen as having been the breaking point. Causing millions of Soviet deaths, and often being referred to as "Russia's Vietnam", the war was as unpopular at home as it was in the West, where a boycott of the Moscow Olympics was called in protest, demonstrating the regime's unpopularity abroad to dissidents at home, thus exacerbating the problem.
Gorbachev
- popular in the West; seen as an international statesman
- membership of the UN
- ending the cold war?
- talks with Regan and Bush successful
Despite Gorbachev's vast successes in nuclear disarmament and in making the USSR acceptable on the world stage, he is often perceived within the USSR as having cared too much for Western ways of life and for PR as opposed to serious policies. Some argue that, had he spent less time on Foreign Policy, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 could have been averted.
As ever - any questions, just ask! :)
- HistGrrl x
As this theme is harder to analyse, I'm providing examples of short paragraphs of analysis after the information.
This theme is going to include the war as a separate element to High Stalinism - and I should probably warn you that I'm doing this one off the top of my head...
The Great Patriotic War
- working with the Allies
- suspicion of foreign powers
- against Germany, Norway and Finland
- A-Bomb
- "Soviet Sphere of Influence"
- Potsdam and Yalta conferences - the cause of the Cold War?
- Lend-Lease
The tensions created by the beginning of the cold war lead Stalin's regime to become even more internal and to spend a lot more on military and defence, dramatically effecting the economy. The Atomic Bomb also lead to changes in policy towards scientists and mathematicians, who were given more civil liberties in order to incentivise them.
High Stalinism
- THATCHER: "aggressive foreign policy"
- Aggression over East Berlin
- Defence spending rocketed
- Comecon
- Not involved in diplomacy with the rest of the world
- Seen as trying to "take over the world"
The internal nature of Stalin's regime at this time lead to distaste and bad feeling from the West, making later easing in relations even harder. However, the "percieved menace of the West" left Stalin with a suitable excuse to become more brutal in his internal policy, and lead him to be presented as a stronger leader, something that many historians agree Russians find necessary in their leaders - especially at this time, when memories of the Tsar were still existent.
Khrushchev
- the "thaw"
- U-2 incident
- Berlin Wall
- Start of the Vietnam War in earnest
- Warsaw Pact
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- economic aid to the third world
- alliance with China breaking down
- Sputnik and the space race
- Suez Crisis, 1956
Khrushchev's role in Soviet Foreign Policy is often seen as having been fatal because of the contradictions between the supposed "thaw" of destalinisation and the problems he caused with the West, over instances such as the building of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact and Cuban Missile Crisis. The "thaw" made him unpopular in the USSR, and his handling of these major events presented him as weak and aggressive both at home and abroad.
The effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis were especially fatal, given that clauses of the Kennedy/Khrushchev agreement which lead to the removal of US nuclear warheads from Eastern Europe were kept secret on the international stage, making it seem as though he had backed down, and thus presenting him as weak within the USSR. This is commonly seen as having been a major cause of his downfall.
Brezhnev
- SALT
- Détente
- Helsinki
- Moscow Olympics
- Afghanistan
- Brezhnev Doctrine
Laver has argued that "Brezhnev presided over a crucial period of Soviet Foreign Policy", given that his actions provoked distaste and opposition both within the USSR and abroad; although the initial SALT treaties and détente meetings were successful in the West as well as in the USSR, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 is often seen as having been the breaking point. Causing millions of Soviet deaths, and often being referred to as "Russia's Vietnam", the war was as unpopular at home as it was in the West, where a boycott of the Moscow Olympics was called in protest, demonstrating the regime's unpopularity abroad to dissidents at home, thus exacerbating the problem.
Gorbachev
- popular in the West; seen as an international statesman
- membership of the UN
- ending the cold war?
- talks with Regan and Bush successful
Despite Gorbachev's vast successes in nuclear disarmament and in making the USSR acceptable on the world stage, he is often perceived within the USSR as having cared too much for Western ways of life and for PR as opposed to serious policies. Some argue that, had he spent less time on Foreign Policy, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 could have been averted.
As ever - any questions, just ask! :)
- HistGrrl x
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Themes: Position of the CPSU
In this post, I'm going to examine the changing position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) throughout the period 1941-1991. It's vague - but remember, you only have 45 minutes to cover fifty years. You can't go into too much detail and still be analytical!
Remember to differentiate between the PARTY and the GOVERNMENT. At certain points, they were synonymous, but at certain points they were completely different.
The changing role will be judged by leader, and "govt" is short-hand for "government".
Stalin
- dominant
- all-powerful
- congresses rarely met
- economic and social control rigid and complete (Gosplan, Zhadnovshchina etc)
- Govt and party synonymous
Khrushchev
- FILTZER: "It was Khrushchev who placed the party back at the centre of the political stage"
- moves to consolidate his own power gave the party more power
- split into industrial and agricultural wings
- legal reforms meant it had less control over people's lives
- government and party organs became more seperate
Brezhnev
- reversal of Khrushchev's reforms
- Nomenklachura and stability of cadres
- LAVER: "ideology had all but lost its meaning to many within the USSR by 1982"
Andropov
- anti-corruption drive to take power back from the mafia
Gorbachev
- law and party separated
- couldn't hold a state and party position
- membership fell by 3 million in 1990
- removal of incentives
- BRESLAUR: "Gorbachev refused to recognise that Yeltsin and the radicals were the future"
- economic control revoked 1988
- CPSU banned in aftermath of coup
- emergence of other parties
Specialist terminology has been used in this post - if you don't know it, please feel free to ask! :)
And... that's one theme down!
- HistGrrl x
Remember to differentiate between the PARTY and the GOVERNMENT. At certain points, they were synonymous, but at certain points they were completely different.
The changing role will be judged by leader, and "govt" is short-hand for "government".
Stalin
- dominant
- all-powerful
- congresses rarely met
- economic and social control rigid and complete (Gosplan, Zhadnovshchina etc)
- Govt and party synonymous
Khrushchev
- FILTZER: "It was Khrushchev who placed the party back at the centre of the political stage"
- moves to consolidate his own power gave the party more power
- split into industrial and agricultural wings
- legal reforms meant it had less control over people's lives
- government and party organs became more seperate
Brezhnev
- reversal of Khrushchev's reforms
- Nomenklachura and stability of cadres
- LAVER: "ideology had all but lost its meaning to many within the USSR by 1982"
Andropov
- anti-corruption drive to take power back from the mafia
Gorbachev
- law and party separated
- couldn't hold a state and party position
- membership fell by 3 million in 1990
- removal of incentives
- BRESLAUR: "Gorbachev refused to recognise that Yeltsin and the radicals were the future"
- economic control revoked 1988
- CPSU banned in aftermath of coup
- emergence of other parties
Specialist terminology has been used in this post - if you don't know it, please feel free to ask! :)
And... that's one theme down!
- HistGrrl x
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4 June 2010
Unit Four - Collapse of the USSR
Only four cards left... we can do this!
Growing threat of nationalism
- LAVER: "A timebomb waiting to explode"
- increasing discontent with Moscow's economic policies
- Gorbachev had no real understanding of how to handle nationalist problems
- threat especially evident where nationalist tradition was strongest
Moves towards separation
NAGORNO-KARBAKH
- Armenian discontent thorughout Soviet period
- war broke out in the late 1980s with Karbakh declaring independence in 1991
GEORGIA
- March for independence, April 1989, attacked by Soviet troops
- Sovereignty declared Nov 1989
- 99% vote for independence, March 1991
UKRAINE
- signalled real collapse of Societ grip, 1990s
BALTIC STATES
- large moves for independence
- chain of hands in peaceful protest
Was nationalism a significant cause in the collapse of the USSR?
'New Thinking' Foreign Policy
- linked to perestroika
- disarmament
- Eastern Europe allowed to secede
- Global Strategy - membership of UN for eg
- 3rd World Relief ended
RISE OF YELTSIN
- Had great popular support
- Angered Gorbachev because of radicalism
- May 1990, elected President of Russia
- 28th Congress, June 1990, rifts over Gorbachev's economic policy occur and he resigns from the party
The Coup
EVENTS
- 18 Aug 1991, Gorbachev held under hosue arrest at his holiday home in the crimea
- Gorbachev refuses to back dwon
- plotters declare a state of emergency, renouncing the union treaty
- needed popular support, which they thought they'd have
- Yeltsin called for resistance to the coup and declared a presidential edict accusing the plotters of treason under Russian law
- Yeltsin declares control of all Russia
- Plotters arrested
WHY THE COUP FAILED
- plotters didn't arrest Yeltsin
- didn't have military support
- media informed people of resistance to the coup
- ordinary people rallied behind Yeltsin
- there was little left for the plotters to take over
- Gorbachev refused to back down
AFTERMATH
- Gorbachev didn't learn from this
- Balance of Power shifts in favour of Yeltsin
- Nationalist forces in republics boosted by confusion at the centre
- 24 Aug - Gorbachev resigned as head of party
- 29 Aug - CPSU banned
- uncertainty leaves Yeltsin in power
How significant was the coup in the collapse of the USSR?
Assesment of Gorbachev
- unpopular
- VOLKOGONOV: "the last Leninist"
FAILURES
- not firing Yeltsin sooner
- never understood nationalist feeling
- substanceless policies ("slogans")
- personality, Raisa, etc
- concern with Foreign Policy
- refusal to work with Yeltsin
- failure to recognise seriousness of coup
POSITIVES
- recognised need for reform
- negotiated peaceful break-away of Baltic States
- ended cold war
- chose colleagues for ability
- didn't use force
What was Gorbachev's role in the collapse of the USSR?
Why did the USSR collapse?
- Nationalism
- Economy
- Gorbachev's errors
- Growing discontent
- Political corruption
Which was the main reason?
YESSSSSSSS... we made it. Course revised.
I'll be back soon with thematic assessments and sample essays - but, for now, take some time off. Relax, have a cuppa (again), and watch some terrible TV. (: Congrats x
- HistGrrl x
Growing threat of nationalism
- LAVER: "A timebomb waiting to explode"
- increasing discontent with Moscow's economic policies
- Gorbachev had no real understanding of how to handle nationalist problems
- threat especially evident where nationalist tradition was strongest
Moves towards separation
NAGORNO-KARBAKH
- Armenian discontent thorughout Soviet period
- war broke out in the late 1980s with Karbakh declaring independence in 1991
GEORGIA
- March for independence, April 1989, attacked by Soviet troops
- Sovereignty declared Nov 1989
- 99% vote for independence, March 1991
UKRAINE
- signalled real collapse of Societ grip, 1990s
BALTIC STATES
- large moves for independence
- chain of hands in peaceful protest
Was nationalism a significant cause in the collapse of the USSR?
'New Thinking' Foreign Policy
- linked to perestroika
- disarmament
- Eastern Europe allowed to secede
- Global Strategy - membership of UN for eg
- 3rd World Relief ended
RISE OF YELTSIN
- Had great popular support
- Angered Gorbachev because of radicalism
- May 1990, elected President of Russia
- 28th Congress, June 1990, rifts over Gorbachev's economic policy occur and he resigns from the party
The Coup
EVENTS
- 18 Aug 1991, Gorbachev held under hosue arrest at his holiday home in the crimea
- Gorbachev refuses to back dwon
- plotters declare a state of emergency, renouncing the union treaty
- needed popular support, which they thought they'd have
- Yeltsin called for resistance to the coup and declared a presidential edict accusing the plotters of treason under Russian law
- Yeltsin declares control of all Russia
- Plotters arrested
WHY THE COUP FAILED
- plotters didn't arrest Yeltsin
- didn't have military support
- media informed people of resistance to the coup
- ordinary people rallied behind Yeltsin
- there was little left for the plotters to take over
- Gorbachev refused to back down
AFTERMATH
- Gorbachev didn't learn from this
- Balance of Power shifts in favour of Yeltsin
- Nationalist forces in republics boosted by confusion at the centre
- 24 Aug - Gorbachev resigned as head of party
- 29 Aug - CPSU banned
- uncertainty leaves Yeltsin in power
How significant was the coup in the collapse of the USSR?
Assesment of Gorbachev
- unpopular
- VOLKOGONOV: "the last Leninist"
FAILURES
- not firing Yeltsin sooner
- never understood nationalist feeling
- substanceless policies ("slogans")
- personality, Raisa, etc
- concern with Foreign Policy
- refusal to work with Yeltsin
- failure to recognise seriousness of coup
POSITIVES
- recognised need for reform
- negotiated peaceful break-away of Baltic States
- ended cold war
- chose colleagues for ability
- didn't use force
What was Gorbachev's role in the collapse of the USSR?
Why did the USSR collapse?
- Nationalism
- Economy
- Gorbachev's errors
- Growing discontent
- Political corruption
Which was the main reason?
YESSSSSSSS... we made it. Course revised.
I'll be back soon with thematic assessments and sample essays - but, for now, take some time off. Relax, have a cuppa (again), and watch some terrible TV. (: Congrats x
- HistGrrl x
Labels:
1980s,
1990s,
1991,
August Coup,
collapse of the USSR,
Economy,
Gorbachev,
historiography,
Laver,
nationalities,
power-struggle,
reform,
Unit Four,
Volkogonov,
Yeltsin
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